A surprising contact on the professional network. A proposal of work from a headhunter, probably a female agent, based in China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 part-time writing a small number of geopolitical reports for a firm from China containing confidential or “insider” information. Compensation in digital currency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, in this scenario, that an element about this method would be amiss. However, China’s influential Ministry of State Security still considers it worthwhile to use headhunters to attempt this – leading MI5 to issue multiple warnings about their operations on the internet.
Massive Approaches on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented scale, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, commercial, military and technological secrets. But a new initiative targeting politicians and Westminster has led the spy agency to take further action.
An espionage warning was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a single slide after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to contact MPs, peers, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
Security Approach and Legislative Updates
In the typical manner of British intelligence, there was no official release of the protective guidance from MI5 or the Home Office. But the agency knew its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to parliament. Republishing it in the press helps the general population more easily recognize communications with a fraudulent intent.
The alert has the effect of flushing out additional details from within parliament, though that is not the agency's main objective. The service wants public figures to understand that just because interactions on professional networks are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been responding to a particular event in parliament, although the burst of activity occur after the awkward collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
The two had been accused of working for the foreign power – a charge they rejected – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that the UK's political system had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and Beijing's Long-Term Goals
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a note of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity risk substantial legal consequences under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if a person engages in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, however, is what Beijing has to gain. A politician who is not a government minister will have restricted knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in parliament: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or genocide was being driven by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Digital Risks
In part there are cultural differences too. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export intelligence collection techniques and the scale of its spy network is vast, engaging three hundred thousand people. A former US official, a American cybersecurity head under president Joe Biden, commented it was occasionally assessed that “China have more English speakers involved in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop contacts over the long term and at times even the agencies have struggled to differentiate legitimate relationships and spying. “China has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official told parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may result in someone rapidly peripheral becomes significant.
Another way to consider the continuous efforts at covert information gathering is in the broader framework of the international competition between Beijing and the west at a level below the level of direct conflict. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent attempts to find covert sources on UK politics online because it wants to be provocative, to display power and because it can.
